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THE GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE AND
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
BY ERNEST J. EBERLING*
The recent demands of the CIO unions for the guaranteed annual
wage have aroused considerable interest in this issue among those
concerned with labor-management relations. Several factors have
accentuated this interest. First, during 1954 when these demands were
being pressed with considerable vigor, a recession had developed,
resulting in a considerable increase in unemployment levels.. Second,
these demands were made on mass production industries manufactur-
ing durable goods which are subject to wide variations in demand and
output during periods of cyclical change. Third, the recent proposals
are taking a form quite different from the existing plans, namely,
they propose an integration with the nation-wide unemployment in-
surance system. Fourth, the guaranteed annual wage is being offered
as a significant approach to the problem of depression unemployment
during a period in bur history when the national government is al-
ready committed to a policy of maintaining high level employment
and utilizing all means available to attain that end.1 Finally, demands
for the guaranteed annual wage come at a time when the economy is
served by a nation-wide unemployment insurance system which has
been in effective operation for the past 15 years.
A policy statement outlining the position of the unions with respect
to this issue was made by the 1953 Convention of the United Auto-
mobile Workers Union as follows:
"(1) The primary-goal of a guaranteed annual wage plan should be to
stimulate management to provide steady full employment, week by week,
the year round.
"(2) Guaranteed annual wage payments should be made to workers for
whom management fails to provide work in amounts sufficient to insure
take-home pay adequate to maintain the living standards which the
worker and his family enjoyed while fully employed.
"(3) All workers should be guaranteed employment or guarantee pay-
ments from the time they acquire seniority. The guarantee should assure
protection against a full year of layoff for all eligible workers and for
shorter periods on a guaranteed basis for those who have not worked the
minimum qualifying period.
"(4) Guarantee payments should be integrated with state unemployment
compensation benefits so that employers can reduce their liabilities by
* Professor of Economics, Vanderbilt University; Research Consultant and
Chief, Research and Statistics, Tennessee Department of Employment Security.
1. See, for example, Employment Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 23 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1021-1024 (1948).
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effectively working toward the improvement of State laws.
"(5) The plan should be administered by a Joint Board of Administration
having equal representation from the union and from management, with
an impartial chairman to break deadlocks. Decisions of the Joint Board
with respect to eligibility and disqualification should be made independ-
ently of decisipns made by State agencies with regard to unemployment
compensation.
"(6) Financing should combine pay-as-you-go, to provide employers with
incentives to stabilize employment, with a reserve trust fund to meet
abnormal costs. Provision should be made for reinsurance to reduce the
size of the required reserves and to spread the risks of abnormal unem-
ployment over the widest possible area of the economy."2
This statement of policy was supported by the following claims:
"(1) GAW plans will help assure continuing full employment and full pro-
duction in peacetime without loss of democratic freedoms.
"(2) Powerful business groups, when they find they have to pay a sub-
stantial part of the cost of unemployment, will find ways to reduce
unemployment.
"(3) The cost of wage guarantees can be reduced by gearing them to un-
employment insurance in a way that will help both programs.
"(4) Current CIO proposals would accordingly provide a substantial
guarantee without undue cost to employers.
"(5) Guarantee annual wage plans will strengthen, not weaken, the
nation's economy and business system.3
This statement of policy and supporting arguments makes it clear
that what the CIO is demanding is the payment of out-of-work bene-
fits about equal or nearly equal to a worker's full time weekly wages
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks in any period of unemploy-
ment. The many advantages claimed for this proposal, such as the
reduction of unemployment, that it can be made effective without
undue cost to employers and that it will strengthen the nation's
economy by maintaining purchasing power, make attractive arguments
to the worker who, above all else, is job conscious and fears unemploy-
ment like a plague.
Then, too, it is hard particularly for the factory worker to under-
stand why the white collared worker is usually paid on an annual
salary basis while he is paid by the piece, hour, day or week. From
the biological point of view, he has the same necessity for a regular
income to satisfy his physical needs. Why should he be paid any
differently? This is a simple and attractive argument which will
probably be used in promoting the guaranteed annual wage.
It is to be expected that these demands of the unions will be exam-
2. Guaranteed Annual Wages, 14 EcoNoMIc OuTLoox 73, 75 (1953).
3. Id. at 77-80.
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ined carefully by both management and students of the problem of
labor relations. Demands similar to these were presented to the man-
agements of some of the largest industries in the country during 1954.
Similar demands will be made of the big automobile companies when
the new contract negotiations begin in 1955. It seems certain that
many controversial issues will develop as these demands are debated
pro and con across the bargaining table.
Wage and employment guarantees are not new in American industry.
As early as the 1890's, such guarantees were collectively bargained in
the wallpaper industry. Following this, and especially during the
1920's, many such plans were adopted by employers unilaterally, for
both humanitarian and economic reasons. Some noteworthy achieve-
ments were attained by management in overcoming seasonal irregu-
larity of operations and in providing steadier jobs for employees.
In addition to such devices as diversified production, stockpiling,
the development of new products and markets, and improved plan-
ning and control of production, at least three different types of guar-
anteed wages or employment were developed:
(1). The guaranteed annual wage plan such as that of the Hormel Com-
pany which assures employees of a specified minimum annual wage, re-
gardless of the amount of work available on any specific working day.
(2) Guaranteed employment plans typified by the Procter and Gamble
Plan which guarantees a minimum amount of work at specified rates.
(3) Guaranteed purchasing power plans like that of Nunn-Bush which
propose to adjust wage rates to whatever extent necessary to maintain
employment and an even flow of real wages to employees.
Many of these plans fell by the wayside during the Great Depression
of the 1930's. The severe unemployment of these years did, however,
maintain interest in efforts to achieve some stability and regularity in
employment. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act,4 which be-
came law in 1938, specifically exempted employers from paying over-
time for weekly hours of work in excess of 40 under colledtive bar-
gaining contracts which guaranteed annual employment.
5
An examination of the long record of attempts to guarantee employ-
ment or wages preceding the recent union proposals for the guaranteed
annual wage reveals several pertinent highlights:
(1) Practically all of these plans were initiated by employers who did
not offer a guarantee extending beyond the employment which was
anticipated in any event. These plans were not expected to take care of
cyclical fluctuations. They stressed employment, not unemployment bene-
fits. Employment stabilization planning always preceded a guarantee-
4. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (1947)
5. The Hormel Plan uses this provision to advantage.
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and the guarantee was not given unless there was real promise of effective
stabilization.6
(2) In spite of all the good will, effort, initiative and intelligence which
have been applied to this problem, employment and wage guarantees
are not widespread, covering substantially less than 1 per cent of the
working force at the present time. As indicated previously, a number
of plans which were started in good faith withered away or became a
casualty of business depression.
(3) Most of the plans in effect currently are tound in industries which
are not subject to a significant volume of cyclical unemployment. Thus,
they exist to the least extent in the durable manufacturing industries
which are the most sensitive to cyclical variations. One study shows that
about two-thirds of the plans are in effect in the non-manufacturing -in-
dustries, such as wholesale and retail trade and service activities, while
those in the manufacturing group exist to the greatest extent in those
industries producing consumer's goods such as food products, textiles, the
manufacture of wearing apparel, soap and similar products.7
(4) The existing plans do not cover all the employees in each of the firms
in question nor do they all guarantee work or income the year round.
Then, too, the duration of the guarantee is also reduced by "safeguarding
provisions" included in the commitment by management. For example:
Many plans provide for the right of suspension in case of such events as
fire, flood, an Act of God, explosion, lightning, a catastrophe, emergency,
war, government orders, sale liquidation, bankruptcy, etc. The guaran-
tee may often be modified or abandoned if the volume of business "falls
below a certain point," or is reduced by a certain percentage. The suspen-
sion of the guarantee, or reduction, may be made with or without the
consent of the union, with or without notice. Firms also tend to reserve
the right to discharge an individual employee even if he is covered by
the guarantee.
It is clear that the guaranteed annual wage has succeeded primarily
and almost exclusively in industries where the demand for the pro-
duct is fairly stable. Such variations as do occur are mostly seasonal
which can be offset by various employment stabilizing techniques
which are well known to industrial management. 8 Actually the pro-
cedure becomes largely an exercise in mathematics, it is feasible and
the result profitable.
Significant demands by unions for a guaranteed wage plan were not
made until World War II. Undoubtedly the difficulty in effecting wage
increases during that period which led to the development of many
6. See U. S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 925,
GUARANTEED WAGE PLANS IN THE UNITED STATES (1947).
7. Ibid.
8. The Hormel Company, for example, contracts with its workers at the first
of the year for a given amount of work. They then receive uniform weekly
pay checks based on this amount. The hours worked vary considerably from
one week to another. If, at the end of the year, employees have worked more
hours than bargained for, they are given a bonus. If they have worked less
than the minimum, they must make it up the following year. This kind of
plan is undoubtedly practicable in many seasonal industries.
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kinds of "fringe benefits," also stimulated demands for the guaranteed
annual wage. Of course there were other factors also, such as the
fear of widespread unemployment in the post-war period and the
probable resulting declines in the membership and strength of the
unions.
The first important demand of this kind came from the United
Steelworkers Union (CIO) in December 1943. It requested that each
employee of the respective companies in the steel industry with which
it was conducting collective bargaining negotiations should be guar-
anteed a minimum weekly wage for each week during the period of
the contract (two years). The minimum weekly wage was to be com-
puted on the basis of the employee's straight-time average hourly earn-
ings for the year immediately preceding the effective date of the new
contract, or such portions thereof during which the employee may have
been employed by the company, plus any general wage adjustment
included in the new contract, multiplied by 40 hours. Union members
employed after the beginning of the new contract were to have their
minimum weekly wage determined by multiplying their straight-
time hourly average rate for the first three months of employment
by 40 hours. For each week during the life of the contract that the
individual employee, unemployed for reasons beyond his control, did
not receive a sum equal to this minimum amount, the company would
make up the difference.
The union based its demand upon the contention that, with the then
foreseeable rate of operations in the steel industry, the guarantee
would cost nothing. They pointed out that since steel companies had
benefited from governmental regulations allowing rapid amortization
of defense plant and equipment, carry-forward carry-back provisions
concerning excess profits taxes, a contract renegotiation law, etc.,
workers should also have some such concessions. The union further
pointed out that farmers, under the Steagall Amendments to the 1941
legislation continuing the Commodity Credit Corporation, were being
guaranteed 90% of parity price supports for most commodities for two
years after the war (92.5% for cotton).
During the same period several other unions made demands for
guarantees of employment, incomes or wages. Thus the United
Automobile Workers (CIO) requested General Motors to establish a
"postwar security fund" for unemployment payments, equal to the
fund the company was setting aside for post-war contingencies. (As of
September 1943, General Motors had put aside $65 million in a con-
tingency fund for post-war expansion.) The union proposed that the
fund be jointly administered by the union and the corporation. Em-
ployees on established seniority lists and former employees returning
[ VOL. 8
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from the armed services for whom the company could not provide
a full week's employment of at least 40 hours were to be paid sup-
plementary allowances in addition to unemployment compensation.
Unemployment compensation plus the supplementary allowance was
to equal 40 hours of pay. This appears to be the beginning of pro-
posals for private supplementation of unemployment compensation
benefits.
Somewhat similar demands were made by the union in collective
bargaining negotiations with the aluminum companies and by the
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America Union in
negotiations with the General Electric Company. The latter demand
in substance, was as follows:
For the duration of the contract employees were to be guaranteed a
weekly wage for each week. The guaranteed weekly wage was to
consist of average weekly earnings of the last complete calendar quar-
ter year of their employment and include any general wage adjust-
ment which was negotiated or ordered during the life of the contract.
Any payments which employees received as a result of the application
of unemployment compensation laws were to be offset against such
guaranteed weekly earnings.
Here again is the proposal that the guaranteed annual wage be inte-
grated with unemployment insurance. None of these plans was ac-
cepted by management. The resulting dispute in the case of the
United Steelworkers was certified to the War Labor Board in February
1944. It denied the request of the union for the guaranteed annual
wage but recommended that the President appoint a commission to
study the problem.9
Subsequent to this, the Office of War Mobilization and Re-employ-
ment created a technical committee to study the issue and make
recommendations. The committee pointed out in its report that none
of the existing plans provided coverage for all employees in the firms
having such plans, that some groups, usually those with the least
stable employment were excluded, that employees became eligible
only after a specified period of employment and that employment was
not guaranteed on an annual full-time basis in many of the plans. The
report concluded that reasonable wage guarantees could be provided
by many industries although it suggested their integration with un-
employment compensation."0
Numerous individuals and organizations conducted studies during
the immediate post-war period to examine the experience to date
9..In re Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. and United Steelworkers (CIO), 19
WAR LAB. REP. 568, 571 (1945).
10. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE ADvIsoRY BOARD, OFFICE OF WAR
MOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION, OFFICE OF TEMPORARY CONTROLS (1947).
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and to determine the feasibility of further expansion to additional
firms and industries."
The high levels of employment and payrolls which developed in the
post-war period instead of the widespread unemployment which had
been feared by many, resulted in a waning of interest in these pro-
posals for several years. In 1951, however, the issue was given re-
newed emphasis by further demands made on the steel companies by
the United Steelworkers Union which called for a minimum guarantee
of 32 hours pay per week, based upon the employee's average hourly
earnings, for any period of unemployment up to one year (52 weeks)
following the employee's layoff or termination of employment by the
employer. The employee's average hourly earnings were to be his
average hourly earnings in a 26 weeks base period. Any payments re-
ceived from unemployment compensation were to be deducted from
this guarantee. Only employees with three or more years of con-
tinuous service with the company were to be eligible.
This proposal was later modified and redefined as follows: the min-
imum guarantee of hours was reduced to 30 per week, with payments
limited to $50-60 per week for 52 weeks of unemployment for em-
ployees with three or more years of continuous service. Employees
laid off would be required to register with the United States Employ-
ment Service and unemployment compensation payments would be
offset against the guarantee. Unemployment payments by the steel
companies would be made from a trust fund financed by a cents per
hour contributions by the company. The company's liability would
be limited to the resources of the trust fund which was to be ad-
ministered by a joint union-management policy committee. This
demand was turned down by management, whereupon the dispute
was brought before the Wage Stabilization Board. It refused to recom-
mend to the companies that they put the proposal into effect. Despite
the lack of progress made by the steelworkers, other unions soon
joined in making similar demands. For example, the United Packing
House Workers (CIO) in negotiations with meat packing concerns,
demanded a guaranteed annual wage of at least $3,000. In 1953 came
the proposal of the United Automobile Workers Union for the guar-
anteed annual wage, although their contracts with the companies do
not open for negotiation until the summer of 1955. Demands for the
guaranteed annual wage were made in 1954 by the unions on the
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, the General
11. See, for example, KAPLAN, THE GUARANTEE OF ANNUAL WAGES (1947);
SNI:ER, THE GUARANTEE OF WORK AND WAGES (1947); U. S. CHAMBER OF COM-
mEnCE, THE EcoNoincs OF THE GUARANTEED WAGE (1948); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, op. cit. supra, note 6; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T or
LABOR, BULL. No. 907, EcoNOmVc ANALYSIS OF GUARANTEED WAGES (1947).
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Electric Company and the United States Steel Company.
In the case of the Westinghouse Company, the International Union
of Electrical Workers-CIO asked for the guaranteed wage to be
financed solely by the company by a payment into a fund of 5 percent
of payroll. Each employee of one year seniority or more would be
given a guarantee of 52 weeks of 40 hours work or 2,080 hours of pay
per year. No payments would be made from the fund until after 52
weeks of accumulation of payments and then only for layoffs begin-
ning after that time. The company would not be liable for payments
beyond the 5 percent of payroll. The trust fund would be administered
jointly by a labor management board.
The same union made similar demands Vipon the General Electric
Company. In both cases the guaranteed wage would be reduced by
state unemployment compensation checks.
It can be seen from this brief review that the recent proposals for
the guaranteed annual wage differ substantially from the guaranteed
wage and employment plans of the past and those currently in effect.
One of the most important of these differences is the proposal to co-
orctnate the guaranteed annual wage with the unemployment insur-
ance system on the assumption that the worker guaranteed, say,
$60.00 a week under the guaranteed wage and who is also entitled
to receive $30.00 a week from the unemployment insurance system,
would actually receive the $30.00 as unemployment insurance and
$30.00 a week from the employer under the guaranteed wage. By thus
offsetting the unemployment insurance payment against the wage
guarantee, the employer would be saved considerable costs according
to the argument for this proposal. Moreover, the more liberal the
insurance payment, the less would be the obligation of the employer
under the wage guaranty. Hence, perhaps the reason why the unions
claim the guaranteed annual wage would strengthen the unemploy-
ment insurance systems-by way of liberalization of benefits.
The steelworkers demand for the guaranteed annual wage was the
first important effort of this kind in the post-war period. Undoubtedly
their proposal to use the guaranteed wage as a supplement to unem-
ployment insurance was influenced greatly by the preceding pro-
posals for such supplementation made during World War II and by
the Latimer Report of 1947 which recommended that wage guarantees
ought to take the form of supplements to unemployment insurance.
There were also some other precedents for such a proposal. Thus in
1946, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the Phila-
delphia Waist and Dress Manufacturer's Association entered into an
agreement covering about 12,000 employees in 275 shops, establishing
a "Fair Income Fund." Employers contributed about 3 per cent
- VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of their gross weekly payroll into a fund which was jointly admin-
istered by the union and the employers' association. Unemployed
workers could draw benefits not to exceed $40.00 a week nor more
than $200.00 a year. Workers receiving such payments were not ex-
cluded from receiving unemployment benefits. The plan was term-
inated in 1952 mainly because employers would not contribute to both
this plan and an old age pension scheme. However, while it was in
operation, many employees received benefits both from the "Fair
Income" fund and from unemployment compensation.
It should be noted, too, that the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled in
1946 that employer payments to such a fund were ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses, deductible under the provisions of Section
23 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code; further, that such contributions
did not constitute wages subject to withholding at the source, although
payments to employees from the fund constituted gross income to
the employee in the year received. Section 302 (c) (5) (A) of the Taft-
Hartley Act 12 appears to give Congressional approval for employer
contributions to trust funds for the purpose of paying unemployment
benefits.
Finally, the Social Security Act of 193513 permits State unemploy-
ment compensation laws to grant a lower rate of contribution to em-
ployers who maintain guaranteed employment accounts under which
all employees are guaranteed 30 hours of wages for each of 40 weeks in
12 months, with one weekly hour deducted for each added week guar-
anteed. Subsequently, a few States included similar provisions in
their laws. All states have now repealed them however; provisions
for experience rating under unemployment compensation having taken
their place.
All of the demands for the guaranteed annual wage made since
1951 have proposed them as a supplementation to unemployment in-
surance. According to its announcements, the United Automobile
Workers will make similar demands of the major motor companies
this year.
This emphasis upon supplementation causes one to wonder whether
the current drive for the guaranteed annual wage should be character-
ized as such or whether it is essentially a device to secure a more
liberal unemployment insurance system. In fact, the UAW-CIO in its
1953 convention recommended that "guarantee payments should be
integrated with State unemployment compensation laws so that em-
ployers can reduce their liabilities by effectively working toward the
improvement of State laws."
12. STAT. 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c).(5) (A) (Supp. 1954).
13. 49 STAT. 644 (1935):, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 3303 (C) (4) (A).
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It is quite evident that the unions have borrowed from the private
pension program, the idea of supplementation of business payments by
government funds, thus providing employers with an incentive to
liberalize Federal and State laws. The analogy is not very good, how-
ever. The coordination, for example, of private pensions with Old
Age and Surviv6rs' Insurance appears to be quite different from the
coordination of the guaranteed annual wage with unemployment in-
surance.
In respect to the former, payment of benefits are made on the as-
sumption that the worker has retired. No incentive to seek work is
involved. Hence, there is no inconsistency in paying him both a private
and a public benefit. But in the latter case, the basis of the unemploy-
ment insurance system is that the individual claimant must remain in
the labor market and actively seek work. Therefore, it is a-uniform
condition in all States that benefits under unemployment insurance
necessarily result in some wage loss so that the unemployed worker
will have an incentive to seek work and not take a "free ride."14 If,
however, a worker received full pay, or nearly that, while idle for a
52-week period, it is assumed that he would not have much incentive
to seek a job elsewhere and the whole system of unemployment in-
surance might well break down. Indeed, it is quite possible that bene-
fits this generous would develop the urge to make a career out of col-
lecting them. In fact, under such conditions workers with the most
seniority might consider it a privilege to be laid off first.
There are other serious problems involved in coordinating the guar-
anteed wage with unemployment insurance. One is that it could not
be put into effect unless the present State unemployment insurance
laws were amended. This is because of the effect of the guaranteed
payment in a given week upon the unemployment insurance payment
for the same week. Wages are generally defined in the state unem-
ployment insurance laws as including all remuneration for services
from whatever source-vacation pay, dismissal pay, bonuses, commis-
sions and wages in lieu of notice.'5
In the states where this question has risen, guarantee payments have
been regarded generally as wages and an unemployed worker who
received a guarantee payment equal to, or in excess of, his weekly
benefit amount has been declared ineligible for an unemployment in-
surance payment for that week. Those receiving a weekly guarantee
less than their respective weekly benefit amounts under unemployment
14. Generally workers receive weekly benefits equal to about 50 percent of
their full-time weekly wages, except for those receiving the maximum benefit
amount which is frequently too low in terms of their weekly earnings to give
them the same proportion.
15. E.g., TENN. CODE SuPP. § 6901.2 L (1950).
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insurance were usually paid the difference. Thus it would appear
that if guarantee payments are construed as disqualifying income,
the states would have to amend their laws in order to make integra-
tion possible from a legal standpoint.
The issue, however, is even broader than this; should, for example,
guaranteed wages be considered as insured payroll for tax purposes
and, further, as a basis for acquiring future benefit rights? If such
is the case, then employers would have to pay unemployment insur-
ance taxes on the guaranteed wages paid during periods of uriemploy-
ment; further, such wages would constitute wage credits for another
round of benefits.
Then, too, there is the problem of disqualification. Who is going
to make determinations of disqualifications? The unions are on record
as taking the position that they will not accept the determinations
made by the unemployment insurance agencies as to whether or not
a claimant is eligible to receive benefits, but will demand an inde-
pendent grievance-appeal machinery of their own. Hence, under
most guaranteed annual wage proposals, an independent decision-
making and appeals procedure would be established. Obviously, many
controversies would arise under such an arrangement. Certainly the
determination of eligibility for benefits is a basic function of the un-
employment insurance agencies under the law. They cannot transfer
this authority to an independent board, nor could they accept the de-
cisions of such a board unless they were compatible with the law and
precedent governing the administration of unemployment insurance.
The questions which will come before such boards involve such
issues as: should a worker who voluntarily quits his job be entitled
to unemployment benefits? Suppose he is discharged for misconduct;
or he refuses to accept a job which is offered him on the grounds that
it does not constitute suitable work; or perhaps he has made no effort
on his own account to find work. Likewise, the issue might be one in-
volving the question whether he has retired from the labor market
by making himself unavailable for work.
These issues constitute the most difficult area of administration in
the unemployment insurance program. Since its early beginnings,
the unemployment insurance agencies have built up a body of
precedents based upon the statute law which governs the decisions
in these cases. Thus, public policy as developed in innumerable
discussions and meetings with representatives of the public, em-
ployees, and employers concerning these issues and expressed in the
law, is .made effective by the administrative determinations of the
agency. Any worker who thinks the decision unfair in his case may
appeal it to a higher tribunal without cost to him.
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It is important to note that the State law and precedents governing
these decisions are based upon the principle of providing uniform
treatment for claimants based upon broad economic and social con-
siderations. On the other hand, the employment relationship in a
given industry involves a special jurisprudence and code peculiar to
that industry and its employees.
As an example, consider the problem of seniority. Seniority rights
have been built up for years by members of the union in individual
plants. The man with the greatest seniority is the last to be laid off
and the first to be hired. Now how do the State UI agencies view this?
Actually, for the most part they ignore seniority in placing unem-
ployed workers in jobs. They operate on the basis of two principles:
(1) the best qualified man should be referred to a job; and (2) they
test willingness to work by the work test in order to avoid improper
benefit payments. Thus, as a public agency, the UI office deals with a
pool of workers and it is inherent in UI policy that a claimant be avail-
able for suitable work which is offered him by an employer.
It might be proposed, of course, that in cases where a worker under
State rules could not draw State benefits, for example, because he
refused certain kinds of work, quit voluntarily or was ruled unavail-
able for work, he could nevertheless receive GAW because the union
contract recognized his eligibility rights, and the board therefore would
rule him eligible. But consider what this would mean. The board
would first have to ascertain whether the worker was entitled to
State benefits and if not, to company benefits. If the general criteria
for eligibility as expressed in State laws were followed by the board,
as proposed, the facts in each case would have to be investigated to
determine whether the claimant was "available for work," "has re-
fused suitable employment," etc. Would the board operating under the
GAW seek information from other employers concerning the question
whether the claimant had refused or accepted a job offer, whether pre-
vailing wages were offered him, whether he had good cause for re-
fusing a job offer from another plant? Or one might ask, would the
board attempt to refer the claimant to jobs?
Another issue involved in the integration of the guaranteed annual
wage with unemployment insurance focuses on the question whether
it is wise either from the point of view of maintaining a sound unem-
ployment insurance program or from the standpoint of social welfare
to set up two classes of recipients of unemployment benefits: one re-
ceiving a combined weekly payment from insurance and guaranteed
wage approximately equal to the full time weekly wage and, the other,
receiving only the weekly benefit amount under unemployment in-
surance-about 50 percent of the full-time weekly wage?
Many inequities can develop from this situation. Suppose, for ex-
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ample, a certain state has a $30.00 weekly maximum insurance benefit
amount and that it has amended its unemployment insurance law to
except guaranteed wage payments from the definition of wages in the
determination of "unemployed" status. Let us assume that employee
A and B each receive $60.00 weekly entitling them to a $30.00 weekly
benefit amount under unemployment insurance.
Employee A is under a 100 percent benefit supplementation plan,
while employee B is not so covered. Both of them are laid off, serve
the required waiting period and then claim benefits at the local em-
ployment office. Employee A reports that he is to receive $30.00 from
his employer covering the past week of unemployment. Nevertheless
he is considered totally unemployed and receives $30.00 state benefit
giving him a total of $60. Employee B reports that he had two days
work in the past week and earned $30.00. No benefits are allowed
him since he had wages equal to benefits. His total income for the
week is $30. In a later week he reports that he had one day's work
and earned $15. He then receives $15.00 in insurance benefits bringing
his income for the week up to $30.
The result then of integrating the guaranteed annual wage with un-
employment insurance would be set up two classes of claimants: (1) a
small minority who would be entitled to receive full pay while un-
employed up to a year, and (2) the vast majority who would only be
entitled to about one-half their weekly pay up to a limit of 20-26 weeks
while unemployed.
Sumner Slichter in commenting on this aspect of the proposals said
recently "The principal objection to the union proposals for supple-
mentary unemployment compensation is that it makes quite uneven
provisions for the unemployed. The supplementary unemployment
compensation is not available to unorganized workers. Since pooling of
reserves and liabilities is probably not feasible in the case of privately
negotiated plans, the union plans are likely to result in the most ade-
quate provision where the need is least and the least adequate pro-
vision where the need is greatest."'16
Finally, an argument which is frequently used to support the inte-
gration of the GAW with the UI system, is that the employer's costs
under the GAW will be minimized. This is difficult to follow since
the employer who finds himself under the GAW will also continue to
pay his UI taxes. If the proportion of the GAW which is paid by
the UI system should be increased, it is likely that his tax rate
under this system would be increased. In fact, it is quite possible that
under the GAW the general level of UI tax rates would rise. The
economy of a number of States, the New England section and Ten-
nessee, for example, is such that a third to a half of the insured unem-
16. DAILY LABOR REPORT No. 31, Feb. 15, 1954.
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ployment comes from such industries as textiles, the manufacture
of wearing apparel, trade and services. These industries have large
unemployment costs year after year, most of which is frictional in
character. Firms in these industries are characteristically small units.
Many of them are already paying a high unemployment tax rate to
the UI system. If the general level of tax rates under the UI system
should rise as a result of the impact of the GAW in the heavy mass
production industries, "small business" as represented by these in-
dustries would be placed in the position of subsidizing the large mass-
production industries.
Another major difference between these proposals and existing plans
for the guaranteed annual wage is that the current demands for
guaranteed wages are being made in the case of industries having
sharp cyclical variations in demand and consequently, in production.
As already noted, the plans now in existence are found almost ex-
clusively in industries having a fairly stable demand for their pro-
ducts-mostly those in the non-manufacturing group. Industries now
affected by these demands include automobiles, steel, aluminum and
electrical equipment producers.
The steel industry, which negotiated with the union concerning this
issue in 1954, was operating at that time at about 65 percent of the
production level of the previous year. A leading authority on business
cycles has stated, "The steel industry cannot do much to stabilize
itself because it cannot by itself stabilize the demand for steel. This
has to be done, if at all, by industries that consume steel .... whether
this degree of organization can be brought about without going so far
as to make the system of private enterprise impossible is a question
that can only be answered by the process of experiment. At the least,
the change would be an evolutionary movement going a long way
toward a system decidedly different from private enterprise as we now
understand it. ' ' 17
A noteworthy study was made of fluctuations in the case of the
automobile industry by Professor Edwin S. Smith as early as 1931.17a
This industry is affected by both wide seasonal and cyclical variations,
the latter intensifying the former. He discussed the efforts which the
automobile companies had made; even by this early date, to stabilize
their production and iron out seasonal changes in production and em-
ployment, such as, advancing the time of new model showings, which
as he indicates "does not appear to have exercised a marked effect
in leveling the sales curve as a whole." He pointed out that, for many
reasons, the production of automobiles must conform to sales. Some of
these reasons are: the impracticability of manufacturing in the dull
17. CLARK, STRATEGIC FAcToRS iN BusINss CYCLES 196-97 (1934).
17a. SMITH, Reducing Seasonal Unemployment c. xiv (1931).
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season and storing the cars because of risk of fire and other damage,
uncertainty as to what changes will be incorporated in new models,
the need to take advantage of new inventories as soon as they appear
and the ability to meet price reductions as they occur.
Further, he indicated that automobile manufacture had become such
a specialized process that any attempt to achieve greater stability in
production by undertaking the manufacture of other products in the
same plants and with the same workers appeared to be utterly im-
practicable.
With respect to cyclical variation, Smith concluded that "the fear of
a business recession is necessarily, and rightly, present in the mind of
the automobile manufacturer who might be contemplating a program
of advance production."
It seems inherent in the union proposals that industries like steel
can effect the necessary stabilization of demand which usually pre-
cedes the offer of a guaranteed wage. It is asserted, for example, that
these proposals "would accordingly provide a substantial guarantee
without undue cost to employers" and that "powerful business groups,
when they find they have to pay a substantial part of the cost of un-
employment, will find ways to reduce unemployment." 18
As already noted, these statements may have validity when applied
to industries with relatively stable demand or to some of those subject
primarily to seasonal fluctuations. Experience has shown, as indicated
previously, that many fims in this latter group of industries can pro-
vide guaranteed wage plans without much difficulty. As Hansen and
Samuelson have pointed out, "By undertaking guaranteed wage pro-
grams and stabilization planning, individual firms can do much to iron
out their seasonal and other irregular rhythms of employment and
thus minimize the costly wastes of unemployment."'19 But it is a differ-
ent matter to assume, that employment stabilization can likewise be
affected in such industries as steel and others manufacturing durable
goods. Here the weight of evidence appears to be opposed to the
idea that a financial stake for instance, can result in significant
stabilization of production. Hence, any employer in these industries
who makes his wage bill a fixed cost for a year in advance, assumes
a considerable risk, the extent of which increases with the cyclical
variability of demand and the proportion which wages comprise of
total cost. Indeed one wonders how the actuaries would compute the
costs. Of course, the company liability could be limited by a provision
requiring that a fixed percentage of the payroll be paid into reserves
18. Guaranteed Annual Wages, 14 EcoNomIC OuTLooK 73, 77 ( 1953).
19. Hansen and Samuelson, Making the Annual Wage Work, New York
Times Magazine, July 13, 1947, pp. 12, 35.
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each year. What assurance is there, however, that a limit of this kind
would provide an adequate reserve? And what would be the results
if reserves proved inadequate and a number of workers were laid
off for whom no benefits were available?
The truth of the matter is, depression unemployment is an all-
pervasive risk arising out of forces over which the individual employer
has little or no control. That is one reason why Congress saw fit to
make provision for a nation-wide unemployment insurance system
and further to enact the Employment Act of 1946. In view of stated
national policy, it may be expected that the Government would move
in quickly with a whole battery of measures to offset the effects of
sharply rising and widespread depression unemployment. It may* be
said, therefore, that the problem of the level of economic activity is
far beyond the scope of labor-management relations. It also seems
equally clear that the causes and cure of the business cycle lie outside
the labor-management relationship.
A third major difference between the current guaranteed annual
wage proposals and existing plans is that the former do not include
the various "safety" measures which are included in the latter. 0 Thus,
for example, the provision that the employer may cancel the plan if
sales decline by a certain percentage is not envisioned in the current
proposals. Yet it is obvious that such a provision would be of great
importance to an employer in a durable goods manufacturing industry
who is suddenly caught in the downswirl of a business slump with a
resulting decline of 30-40 percent of production as occurred in the case
of the steel industry in 1953-54.
In support of the current proposals the unions have resorted to the
purchasing power argument, namely, that the guaranteed annual wage
will help maintain purchasing power and thus check the development
of a depression. The guaranteed wage is thus held to be one of the
answers to the business cycle. One of the leading spokesmen for these
proposals has described them "as a matter of economic necessity in
order to maintain full production and full employment and to avoid
a disastrous depression." Another has called the guaranteed annual
wage "insurance against depressions."
It is obvious that these arguments will constitute a strong appeal
both to union members and the public. The memories of the Great
Depression are still vivid in the minds of many, and a proposal which
promises this result should be scrutinized carefully.
The term "purchasing power" is often used very loosely and incor-
20. For a description of these, see AaERcAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION,
ANNUAL WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT STABILIZATION TECHNIQUES, Research Report
No. 8, p. 22 (1945),
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
rectly. Thus it is often regarded as the total money income in the
economy. In a more limited sense, it is considered as the money in-
come of workers. Neither view is correct. Rather, purchasing power
should be considered as the quantity of goods and services which can
be bought with the money income received by all individuals in the
economy. It is, therefore, a measure of the relationship between
aggregate personal income and the price level. The aggregate personal
income includes all forms of income-rent, interest and profits as well
as wage and salary income. The view rather widely held, therefore,
that underwriting private consumption especially on the small scale
envisaged by the GAW would necessarily ensure high levels of em-
ployment is not correct. It fails to recognize the dynamic role of in-
vestment and savings. Wage and salary income, furthermore, depend
on the volume of employment as well as the level of wage rates.
Thus, there are several determinants of purchasing power: (1)
money wage rates, (2) the volume of employment, (3) the size of non-
wage incomes, and (4) the level of retail prices. Another might be
added, namely, the desire and willingness of individuals to spend
rather than to save. A change in any one may result in offsetting
changes in one or more of the other factors.
Woud the current proposals then contribute significantly to check-
ing a depression by maintaining purchasing power?
Obviously, the GAW would constitute additional wage costs in the
nature of a fixed overhead expense. Further, to the extent that un-
employment occurred under this plan, the management would be re-
quired to pay for idle time. The extent of the risk would be governed
by the proportion of the work force covered by the guarantee, the
duration of the guarantee, the amount of income guaranteed to the
worker and the amount of unemployment experienced under the plan.
The risk could be considerable and the costs heavy.
In answering the question as to the effects of the GAW upon pur-
chasing power it is important to emphasize, first, that benefits under
this plan would constitute such a small segment of the total consump-
tion income as tO be relatively insignificant so far as purchasing power
throughout the economy is concerned. Secondly, if benefits were
financed by reserves withdrawn from distribution during periods of
high level employment, they could reduce consumption at such times,
thus exerting a strong influence toward deflation and hence toward un-
employment. If such reserve accumulation materially reduced profits,
a similar result might develop from lessened investment and capital
expansion or replacement.
Somewhat similar effects coud be expected, as Slichter has pointed
out, from "pay-as-you-go" plans. In this case managements would
likely strive to maintain a high liquidity of assets, which in turn, would
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tend to restrict the financing of expenditures for replacement, product
research and the introduction of new ventures.
Investment expenditures constitute an important and the most
dynamic component of money income and if they shrink because of the
risk involved in making new ventures, then national income will
shrink with resulting unemployment. It is, in other words, quite pos-
sible that the adverse effects upon the average level of net investment
over the period of a complete business cycle would be far greater in
reducing purchasing power than gains to be achieved by an increase
in consumption resulting from the GAW.
When we add to this argument the considerations involved in refer-
ence to the psychological aspects of the cycle such as the tendency of
persons to save rather than to spend in periods of incipient price de-
clines, it would seem highly questionable that the current proposals
for the GAW could have any significant effect in checking the course
of a cyclical decline.
One possible development if management assumed the risk of making
its payroll a fixed overhead expense as involved in the GAW might
be that it would decide to reduce its payroll to a level which it consid-
ered "safe," thus laying off a number of employees. Work would then
be stabilized for a smaller proportion of the work force. It is, there-
fore, possible that a number of workers would find that they were
stabilized in a condition of unemployment. Such shrinkage of payrolls
would have also an adverse effect upon "supplier" plants and upon the
economy as a whole.
Finally, the probable effects of the GAW upon the price level should
be noted. If the costs of production are materially increased as they
undoubtedly would be by the GAW, then product prices would tend
to rise, which in turn could cause the demand to shrink with resulting
reduction in production and increased unemployment.
Of course, if the Government footed the bill there would be less
doubt that the guaranteed annual wage would add to total spending
power; but neither management nor labor has made this proposal. It is
the mass shrinkage of expenditures which constitutes the main problem
of the business cycle.
Another aspect of this argument relates to the question-how many
workers will have their incomes augmented by the guaranteed annual
wage? It is questionable as pointed out previously that any consider-
able segment of consumer purchasing power could be directly sus-
tained by guaranteed wages.
To effect a wide enough coverage to materially influence purchasing
power, it would necessarily be assumed that it is not individual firm
stabilization that is conceived, but presumably industry-wide stabiliza-
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tion. Such an application of these plans might entail, as one authority
puts it, "Collusive action or a degree of cooperation among competi-
tors beyond the limits permitted by present public policy."121 It would
necessarily involve considerable government intervention, which, it
has been suggested, might better be directed in other directions which
would contribute far more to stabilizing employment.
Two leading economists have said this of the guaranteed annual
wage: "Unequivocally, therefore, we reply 'No' to the question as to
whether the guaranteed wage is a panacea for the business 'cycle or
even a major weapon in the battle for sustained employment."22 They
have stated further that it cannot be relied upon to cure the unem-
ployment experienced by our free enterprise system and that it cannot
be regarded as a substitute for our social security system or the full
employment program as outlined in the Employment Act of 1946.
There would appear also to be serious problems for the unions in-
volved in these proposals. One relates to seniority. Apparently the
greatest amount of protection would be given to workers with long
seniority. Yet they are the ones who need it the least. How much
protection can be given to workers with low seniority?
It may be expected that the unions among the mass production
workers will press for coverage of most low seniority workers. They
could hardly afford to do otherwise. In this event the long seniority
workers will wonder what they are going to get out of this proposal.
In many instances they will very likely get the amount of employ-
ment guaranteed regardless of the plan. However, if the plan should
prove to be costly, as it probably would, they might well have to
forego wage increases because of it. The accumulation of a trust fund
might intensify their resentment as they realized that they might
never receive any payments from it. Their status here would be quite
different from that in respect to the accumulation of pension funds
where workers who stay on can look forward to future benefits.
In conclusion, it should be recognized that the worker's desire
for job security is fundamental and that management has a real obli-
gation to develop stabilization techniques wherever possible. Such
efforts where successful represent a gain to the worker, management
and the community. Management already has abundant incentive
to stabilize production. In addition to possible gains in worker morale,
reduced turnover of personnel, and higher worker productivity, it
stands to gain from considerable reductions in tax rates under the
unemployment insurance system. Thus, industries which are highly
21. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 907, Eco-
NOMICS ANALYSIS OF GUARANTEED WAGES 56 (1947).
22. Hansen and Samuelson, supra note 15, at 35.
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unstable in production operations are already paying a high cost for
this condition in the case of their unemployment insurance taxes.
Success in the immediate future in stabilizing production would seem
to lie mainly in that area where demand for the products of individual
firms fluctuates within a relatively narrow range. Thus, manufactur-
ing plants produicing stable consumer goods, and the marketing and
service industries would appear to afford the greatest opportunities
in this direction.
Cyclical variations constitute a great obstacle to the spread of annual
wage plans. The adoption of such plans might well cause not only
grave difficulties for those firms affected by considerable unemploy-
ment risk arising out of such variations, but also lead to drastic changes
in our economic institutions, which even the supporters of the guaran-
teed annual wage might not desire.
Finally, the proposal to coordinate the guaranteed wage with our
federal-state unemployment insurance system involves many serious
issues, one of which could be a significant weakening of the whole
system. There are formidable obstacles-both legal and administra-
tive-to such coordination. Furthermore, certain basic principles of
unemployment insurance are involved in this proposal, not the least of
which concerns the incentive to work. Where this system is in need
of strengthening and liberalization, would it not be a more effective
approach to the problem of unemployment to make direct efforts to
that end? Mass unemployment resulting from cyclical declines in
industrial and business activity can be effectively coped with only on
the basis of a broad front of activity, not by a firm-by-firm approach.
It was in recognition of this fact that the nation-wide unemployment
insurance system was established. It already provides substantial
wage guarantees against unemployment to some 40 million insured
workers. With the exception of two states the costs of this program
are financed solely by taxes on employers. With current reserves of
over $8 billion, it is helping -greatly to alleviate privation caused by
the recent increase in unemployment.
But this system can only lighten the first shock of a cyclical down-
turn. Beyond this a whole battery of measures may be needed which
promise help to all workers, not to a small minority.
